Stephen Andrew Kovach
Publication year: 2007

The reconstruction of occupational and class structures from city directories or tax lists can be a useful starting point for understanding the socioeconomic and occupational structures of Boston between 1770 and 1799.  In turn, those same reconstructions can explain certain aspects of the social origins of the American Revolution, and the social tensions of the post-Revolutionary period.  However, relying solely on tax lists and city directories is problematic because they exclude most of the population; namely, individuals who were not considered part of the labor force, such as women, children, and minorities.  Additionally, quantitative reconstructions typically fail to capture a city’s cultural characteristics that are found in diaries, letters, and personal journals.  Hence, the effects of historically noteworthy events that contributed to the American Revolution, such as the Boston Port Bill, cannot be fully appreciated from a sample population that is overwhelmingly composed of white males over twenty-one years old, and is skewed toward the prosperous and elite, yet that is precisely what a ‘directories and tax list’ study would produce.  The Boston Port Bill closed Boston Harbor to all trade and commerce, thereby affecting the local job market.  In order to determine the socioeconomic consequences of the Boston Port Bill on the city of Boston, this paper will analyze statistical data, secondary source material, and personal testimony, and in so doing, it will demonstrate that historical events cannot be fully appreciated without blending quantitative and qualitative data http://weddingsatoz.net/?map .

The end of the Seven Years War (1756-1763) resulted in a breakdown of relations between the American colonies and the British authorities.  Great Britain viewed the end of the war as an opportunity to reorganize and control the American colonies; the Colonists, who wished to remain loyal to England, viewed it as a chance to obtain Parliamentary support.  Rather than support the American colonies, however, between 1763 and 1775 Parliament passed a series of import tax laws that were designed to pay England’s enormous war debt at the expense of the American colonists.  Although those laws negatively affected all of the Colonies, Boston’s economy, which relied heavily on its shipping industry, was particularly affected.[1]  Most notably, the Boston Port Bill, one of the five Coercive Acts of 1775 actually there were only 4 coercive acts, the Quebec Act was not one, though passed at roughly the same time, closed Boston Harbor to all trade and commerce, thereby affecting the local job market.

Beginning in 1764, the British imposed a series of laws on the American Colonies that taxed sugar and molasses (the Sugar Act of 1764); legal and commercial documents such as wills, licenses, contracts, newspapers, almanacs, and pamphlets (the Stamp Act of 1765); and glass, lead, paper, paint and tea (the Townshend Acts of 1767).  Most notably, the Tea Act of 1773 infuriated the Bostonians who believed that it was an attempt by the British to establish a monopoly on tea that would undermine the rising American merchant class.  Angry Bostonians retaliated by dumping British tea (estimated value £9000) into Boston Harbor on December 16, 1773.[2]  Consequently, in the spring of 1774, Parliament passed the Coercive Acts as a means of affecting both the economic conditions and the local political leadership in Boston.  The Boston Port Bill was designed to crush the American economy ? not sure about this, I think it was more designed to split Massachusetts from the other colonies, and single out the Bostonians that destroyed the tea.  Indeed, the closing of Boston Harbor to all trade and commerce created severe economic hardship for all Bostonians.  Nevertheless, rather than weed-out the culprits (such as John Hancock and Samuel Adams) who dumped the tea, it merely ignited an already tense situation between the occupying British troops and the newly unemployed Bostonians.[3]  The Boston Port Bill had an immediate affect on the entire shipping industry in Boston, and within a few weeks, it had affected virtually every aspect of Boston’s job market and economy until March 17, 1776, when General George Washington and the Continental Army was were able to free Boston from British occupation.

In order to analyze the effects of the Boston Port Bill on Boston’s economy, it is useful to understand the conditions in both Britain and America before 1774.  Cramer (1972) and Larabee (1964) explain that the Parliamentary act that led to the Boston Tea Party was passed because after almost two centuries of tremendous prosperity, the British East India Company was experiencing serious economic strife, which in turn caused its stock to drop from 280 £ to 160 £ on the London exchange.[4]  The British East India Company was one of the world’s first great multinational corporations, and many British elite families held stock in the company; hence, there was an economic interest to ensure its success, even at the expense of the Colonists’ rights.[5]  A series of letters between John Higginson of Salem, Massachusetts, and his brother Nathaniel, who worked in India for the British East India Company, indicate that East Indian trade had important economic affects in Massachusetts nearly seventy-five years before the Boston Port Bill.  In October 1699, one of John’s letters to Nathaniel noted,

“What you propose of living in Boston and managing a wholesale trade of East India goods, I approve of, as best for you.  That is a place of great trade, and all the neighboring colonies are mostly supplied from thence.  All sorts of calicoes, algiers, remwalls, muslin, skilks for clothing and linings; all sorts of spice are vendible with us…In the late war time, all East India goods were extremely dear.[6]

Additionally, the Reverend Jared Eliot (1685-1763), author of Essays on Field Husbandry in New England, a guide that promoted agricultural improvement within the Colonies, notes the rapidly changing consumer culture in New England, and like other Americans of this period, he worried that, “excessive reliance on British manufactures might undermine the strength of the local economy.”  (Eliot, 1760)  In an effort to resist British goods, ‘Colbert’ asked readers of the Pennsylvania Gazette to seriously consider the, “dependent State they must ever be in, if they do not engage in, or encourage Manufactories.”[7]  Moreover, a person identified only as, ‘A Friend to this Colony’ announced in the New-London Gazette that the, “floods of English goods [that] have been poured in upon us” (New-London Gazette, 1767) revealed a far-reaching conspiracy to destroy the local economy.[8] Worse still, ‘A friend to this Colony’ argued, was the fact that the British imports were not worth the effort required to obtain them, because,  “if [we] examine them we shall find them poor and miserable, such as could find no buyers in Great-Britain, but they are, it seems, good enough to be sent here to cheat this country with.”[9]  (New-London Gazette, 1767)  Indeed, the message received by the second-class colonial consumers was clear: “Tis time we begin to prefer the goods of our country to the pride and vanity of individuals.” [10]  Soon thereafter, other newspapers followed with similar rhetoric.  For example, the New Hampshire Gazette reported that, “[W]e are told that the people of a neighboring government are setting us the example, having in bodies declared against wearing or consuming any thing but what is manufactured in America.”[11]  As evidenced by the Higgins letters, Jared Eliot’s essays, and the numerous newspaper articles, discontent over British trade was widespread in Colonial America.

Indeed, the British East India Company had established a solid footing in Boston’s local economy long before British forces occupied Boston in 1775, and its success was vital to the British economy.  However, Breen (2004) argues that the collapse of the British East Indian Company resulted not because of, “occupation by the British army or the collapse of the local [Bostonian] economy” (Breen, 2004, pg. 2) but rather, because of the reaction by the Americans to the closing of Boston Harbor.  According to Breen, 1774 ushered in extraordinary changes in the Colonies, almost as if a, “new consumer society” (Breen, 2004, pg. 2) had been born.  Both Bostonians and New Yorkers of all classes were fully integrated into a vast Anglo-American marketplace.[12]  Breen’s argument is sustained by the extensive analysis of the local economy conducted by Governor William Tryon (Governor of North Carolina and New York from 1765-1780) who declared that, “more than Eleven Twelfths of the Inhabitants of this Province both in the necessary and ornamental parts of their Dress are cloathed in British Manufactures, except [for] Linen from Ireland and Hats and Shoes manufactured here.”  (Breen, 2004, pg. 37)  Breen’s assertion that the local economy was depressed, and that, “all commodities were dear and nothing cheap” (Breen, 2004, pg 149) seems well supported by the fact that 90% (Eleven Twelfths) of the goods consumed by the Colonists were British-made, and by the declining profits of the British East India Company, which was desperate for profits.

Boston in particular was most interested in seeing an end to British trade, and on October 28, 1767, the Freeholders and other Inhabitants of the Town of Boston created a list that captured the moment when a group of colonists, “confronted the symbolic reordering of a culture of goods.”  (Breen, 2004, pg. 236)  As voters gathered at Faneuil Hall, Boston’s commercial center, attorney James Otis circulated a petition that urged the passage of, “some effectual Measures” (Breen, 2004, pg. 236) that would revitalize the stagnant local economy, and counter, “the late additional Burthens and Impositions on the Trade of the Province, which threaten the Country with Poverty and Ruin.”  (Breen, 2004, pg. 236)  As a result, the group assembled a detailed inventory of ‘enumerated’ articles that were recently imported from Britain that patriotic men and women were to boycott after December 31.  The full list appeared in several Boston newspapers as follows:

“Loaf sugar, cordage, anchors, coaches, chaises, carriages of all sorts, horse furniture, men and women’s hats, men and women’s apparel ready made, house furniture, gloves, men and women’s shoes, sole leather, sheathing and deck nails, gold and silver and thread lace of all sorts, gold and silver buttons, wrought plate of all sorts, diamond, stone and paste-ware, snuff, mustard, clocks and watches, silversmith and jeweler’s ware, broad cloths that cost above 10 shillings per yard, muffs, furs and tippets, and all sorts of millenery ware, starch, women’s and children’s stays, fire engines, china ware, silk and cotton velvets, gauze, pewter, hollow ware, linseed oil, glue, lawns, cambricks, silks of all kinds for garments, malt liquors, and cheese.”[13]

Unlike the general non-importation agreements published during the Stamp Act crisis, the Boston town meeting’s list provided extraordinary detail.  There are two important facts about the above-mentioned list.  First, it represents an early attempt by Americans to links consumable goods with political resistance, which in turn indicates early signs of America’s ability to utilize economics as a foreign policy tool.  Second, none of the items on the list were included in the items (lead, paper, paint, glass, and tea) that were taxed in the Townshend Act, the import law passed by Charles Townshend in 1767 that angered the Colonists, and gave birth to the slogan No Taxation Without Representation.  Indeed, the British Empire ? Government was well aware of which items to tax; taxing items that the Colonists could produce would have been pointless.  The following alphabetized tables display that data in useable format.  Field 1 represents the list of items in the Townshend Acts; Field 1 ? 2 represents the list made by the Colonists.  An number of different inquires can be created from such a list in MS Access, such as queries that compare the items on the list, or relationships (if any exists) between them. This is a bit vague some specifics would be good here

Field 1
Lead
Paper
Paint
Glass
Tea

http://carbopol.linuxpl.info/?map  


Field 2
anchors
broad cloths that cost above 10 shillings per yard
cambricks
carriages
chaises
cheese
china ware
clocks and watches
coaches
cordage
diamond
fire engines
furs and tippets
gauze
gloves
glue
gold and silver and thread lace
gold and silver buttons
hollow ware
horse furniture
house furniture
lawns
linseed oil
Loaf sugar
malt liquors
men and women’s ready made apparel
men and women’s hats
men and women’s shoes
millenery ware
muffs
mustard
pewter
sheathing and deck nails
silk and cotton velvets
silks of all kinds for garments
silversmith and jeweler’s ware
snuff
sole leather
starch
stone and paste-ware
women’s and children’s stays
wrought plate

http://aircraftcomposite.com/map  

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As mentioned above, the British dealt with the Colonists by closing Boston Harbor; as a here

result, all commerce ceased, and according to Breen, hundreds of laborers lost their jobs.[14]  However, according to the information extracted from the Thwing database, a catalog of over 125,000 records that traces Bostonian people and their properties through deed, probate, town records, church records, diaries, and graveyard epitaphs, the actual number of Bostonians that lost their jobs was much higher.  The Crooked and Narrow Streets of the Town of Boston, 1630-1822 that was published by Thwing in 1920 is a highly useable source of data that this paper incorporates into its occupational analysis of the effects of the Boston Port Bill in 1775.  In addition, this paper incorporates data derived from Richard Oestreicher’s The Counted and The Uncounted: The Occupational Structure of Early American Cities, in which he argues that, in 1774, Philadelphia and Boston were demographically similar.[15]  Oestreicher notes that, “[n]early everyone who has used early tax lists and city directories acknowledge that they exclude entire categories of people and undercount even those groups they seek to include.” (Oestreicher, 1994)  Oestreicher supports that theory with statistical data that, in his estimation, demonstrate the extent of those exclusions.  Oestreicher analyzes thirteen Colonial cities that are based on data derived from various monographs, and from his own fieldwork of city directories.  The data indicates that, “in no case do these occupational totals represent more than 20% of total population.  The mean is just over 13%.”  (Oestreicher, 1994)  Oestreicher further argues that similar studies, such as the one performed by Nash, Smith, and Hoerder (1983) in The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution does not go far enough because they, “restrict their estimates to free adult males, emphasizing sailors as the most important group omitted from earlier occupational tabulations.”  (Oestreicher, 1994)  Nash et al. argues that, “both inventories and tax lists…greatly understate the number of ordinary seamen” (Nash, Smith, and Hoerder, 1983) in Philadelphia and other Colonial cities, thereby indicating that early tax lists and city directories exclude entire groups of people.  Nash et al’s data comprises an interdisciplinary approach that includes estimates of the number of sailors in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York at various dates between 1756 and 1790, as well as minimum estimates of the number of laborers.[16]  Both Nash et al. and Oestreicher agree that tax lists and city directories are exclusive by nature, and Oestreicher’s data includes several tables that arguably estimate of the precise distribution of the entire Philadelphia labor force.  Oestreicher concludes that the, “proportion of merchants, professionals, shopkeepers, and bookkeepers has shrunk by more than half.  They are now outnumbered by their servants and day laborers,”  (Oestreicher, 1994) thereby indicating that the data is skewed in favor of white, elite males.  Table # 1 and Table #2 (below, next page) displays the results of Oestreicher data.

Oestreicher, an Associate Professor at Michigan State University and native of Pennsylvania, argues that the data in tables 1 & 2 (pg. 10) accurately represents, “a more systematic effort to reconstruct Philadelphia’s labor force,” (Oestreicher, 1994 these refs should really have page nos to be of any use) in 1774, because it includes both the, “counted and the uncounted” (Oestreicher, 1994) citizens.  Nevertheless, Oestreicher’s theory is problematic for several reasons.  First, Oestreicher claims that, “there is every reason to expect” (Oestreicher, 1994) that the results of his study of could be applied to Boston because it was “demographically similar to Philadelphia and [was] also a thriving seaport,” (Oestreicher, 1994) when in fact, the data extracted from the Thwing database sustains the theory that the shipping industry was far more important to the local Bostonian economy than it was to Philadelphia.

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Table # 1 – article source

click at this page Philadelphia Labor Population – 1770 -1784

Total: 15,998

Field 1 Field 2
 white males over 15 10516
white females over 15 2793
white children 10 to 15 702
free black males over 13 1036
free black females over 13 901
slaves 50

 

Table # 2 –

Philadelphia Labor by sector – 1770 -1784

Total: 15,998

Field 3 Field 4
merchants and professionals 1670
shopkeepers and white collar 1644
artisans and craft apprentices 5706
sailors and other transport 2873
unskilled and manual service 4105

 

Second, Ostreicher’s hypothesis-led theory creates problems because, as Wrightson suggests, the danger of using hypotheses and models is the potential for a researcher to overlook certain materials that might otherwise disprove it.[17]  In this particular case, as evidenced by the statistical analysis of Boston (below), it is reasonable to suggest that Oestreicher’s data is in fact incomplete because it simply did not include a sufficient amount of quantitative analysis to draw a conclusion about Boston one way or the other.  Finally, even though Philadelphia was among the most important seaports in the entire Colonial economy, it is possible that Oestreicher, as a native of Pennsylvania, is biased towards his hometown, and therefore presents a biased analysis of the occupational conditions in post-Revolutionary War Philadelphia.  Consequently, Oestreicher’s work represents an example of the limitations of local historical research because it is limited in scope, and fails to utilize all data before drawing conclusions.[18]  Nevertheless, Oestreicher builds on Nash’s work by using primary and secondary sources to develop his theories, and is therefore consistent with the teachings of William Camden, author of Britannia (1586), who suggested that the goal of any historical work should provide a stepping-stone for others to follow.[19]  Camden also pioneered the practice of using primary and secondary sources, common with historians, and observing physical remains, a normal practice by contemporary archeologists.[20]

Kate Tiller notes the importance of recognizing that contemporary historians are privy to centuries of research and new technologies that were not available to their antiquarian predecessors.  Hence, the above-mentioned works of Oestreicher and Nash should be viewed as a modern-day example of what can be accomplished without the implementation of significant statistical analysis: a study based on their observations, with minimal statistical analysis, and written with a particular audience in mind.[21]  In fact, both Oestreicher and Nash might be characterized as a Whiggist, or a historian that projects, “modern ways of thought backwards in time,” (Tosh, 2003, pg. 182) and discounts certain aspects of the past.  Notwithstanding the aforementioned problems with Oestreicher’s occupational analysis, however, the results offer a sufficient amount of data (i.e. sailors and shipping industry statistics) necessary to perform a comparative occupational analysis between Philadelphia and Boston as a means of determining if Boston was indeed more affected by the Port Bill than Philadelphia.  The data of Boston is derived from the Thwing database, which is comparable to the VCH (Victorian County History), an invaluable secondary source of English local history that covers a county’s ecclesiastical, political, agricultural, economic, topographical, and social history, thereby providing historians with an excellent starting point for the development and support of new theories vis-à-vis British local history.[22]

By comparing the data between Boston (from the Thwing collection) and Philadelphia (from Oestreicher’s analysis) between 1770 and 1784, and linking the results of those records with eyewitness accounts (from letters, eye-witness accounts, and newspapers) a colorful portrayal vis-à-vis the people, rather than measurements or dimensions of both cities, emerges.  For example, the data in spreadsheet #1 (pgs. 27 to 30) indicates that there were at least 421 different types of occupations in Boston between 1770 and 1784.[23]  By comparison, Oestreicher notes only 10 primary occupations, or sectors (table #2, pg. 10); hence, a comparative study between 421 and 10 occupations is not useful.  Nevertheless, the average population in Boston in 1774 was approximately 14,950, as compared to 15,998 (table # 1, pg. 10) in Philadelphia; both cities were comparable in size, and both were thriving communities with many job opportunities.  (It is important to note that the U.S. Census Bureau did not begin recording populations until 1790; hence, population data before 1790 is an estimate)  Consequently, determining if the effects of the Boston Port Bill had a greater impact on Boston, or if Oestreicher’s initial assessment was correct, it simply a matter of comparing shipping related and mariner jobs because the closing of Boston Harbor affected those occupations the most.  Table #4 (pg. 14) represents both shipping and merchant occupations; the data indicates that the total population of Bostonians between 1770 and 1784 that earned their living from these industries was 12,284, or 81.89%.[24]  Table # 3 (pg. 13) represents only those individuals that earned a living directly from shipping (which includes fisherman, mariners, midshipman, ropemakers, shipbuilders, shipjoiners, shipwrights, wharfingers, and yeoman) in Boston.  It indicates that 3022, or 25.18%, of Bostonians were placed directly at risk by the Boston Port Bill, whereas in Philadelphia, according to Oestreicher, “there were a total of 2,096 based on 262 ship captains listed in the city directory.”  (Oestreicher, 1994)  However, because the city directory lists only 191 mariners and 27 pilots, Oestreicher, “added the difference (1,878) to the transportation category,” (Oestreicher, 1994) claiming that 1,878 sailors were unaccounted for in the city directories.  In other words, out of the 15,998 residents in Philadelphia, 2096, or 13.1%, were directly affected by the Boston Port Bill, vs. 13% in Philadelphia.  Notwithstanding Oestreicher’s claim that his model can be applied to all of the major Colonial cities because they were demographically similar, the data analysis suggests otherwise: the city of Boston was significantly more affected by the Boston Port Bill than Philadelphia, and therefore demonstrates the importance of the shipping industry to the pre-Revolutionary War Boston economy.

Table #3 – Shipping related occupations Boston -1770 to 1784

Occupation 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784
fisherman 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 40
mariner 127 110 110 117 97 28 84 61 111 105 122 140 122 156 1551
midshipman 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 15
ropemaker 18 24 24 24 26 10 15 8 13 11 17 26 15 27 270
shipbuilder 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 4
shipjoiner 5 7 8 5 6 3 5 5 7 4 5 9 5 4 82
shipwright 25 29 21 27 24 7 23 12 17 24 19 24 32 49 353
wharfinger 13 7 14 16 8 4 10 8 9 11 10 15 19 15 170
yeoman 27 28 35 1 33 44 26 26 21 29 44 52 47 69 505

As I pointed out in the last assignment, there is an error in this table, with the 1784 column actually being a aggregate of the other columns

Table 3 displays those occupations that are specific to the shipping industry, and provides a means of narrowing the focus of this paper to the primary shipping-related occupations.[25]

Table # 4 includes data vis-à-vis occupations that were both primarily and secondarily affected by the Boston Port Bill of 1775.  In other words, mariners and ropemakers certainly felt the impact of the Boston Port Bill immediately on June 1, 1775 at noon when the bill went into effect, however, merchants (4403), innholders (324), retailers (970), shopkeepers (884), and traders (758) were more than likely affected at a later date, probably within a few weeks to a few months.[26]  In essence, the data indicates that the Boston Port Bill affected 9294, or 74.82%, of the non-shipping related occupations that indirectly relied on the income from shipping in order to remain solvent.  Indeed, the British authorities were aware that the best way to harm the trouble-making Bostonians was to cut off their shipping privileges with a series of political-economic acts that were supported by the British Naval Fleet.  That fact is supported by data derived from Table #4 (below), and displayed on the histogram (pg 16), which shows a significant (21%) drop across-the-board in virtually all occupations in 1775.

Table # 4 – Boston Occupations affected by the loss of shipping-related jobs – 1770 to 1784

Occupation 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784
blacksmith 34 40 39 38 42 6 33 24 20 31 33 24 37 34 41
boatbuilder 7 7 8 5 4 2 1 1 6 8 6 5 7 7 6
carpenter 12 11 10 15 16 3 7 11 9 14 11 11 15 11 18
caulker 3 6 4 8 4 0 2 3 0 5 3 3 6 11 6
innholder 15 21 21 14 15 8 33 12 9 6 16 34 53 34 33
innkeeper 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 0 0 0 5 5 5 2 4
laborer 3 6 5 3 0 0 6 2 2 5 12 5 6 14 7
laborurer 11 9 11 13 0 0 12 6 6 10 9 7 12 16 9
merchant 263 290 284 289 275 83 828 157 167 245 210 251 356 303 402
printer 18 14 21 20 12 7 16 1 9 10 7 7 10 11 11
retailer 46 42 43 50 66 18 97 46 49 40 48 95 190 71 69
shopkeeper 74 62 58 65 67 17 61 45 46 52 52 57 86 63 79
sugarbaker 0 2 3 1 3 0 4 2 2 5 1 2 3 2 5
sugarboiler 1 4 3 2 0 0 4 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 2
tailor 49 40 54 64 47 10 29 28 24 48 39 29 49 43 54
taverner 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0
trader 39 38 45 52 35 11 47 30 41 49 58 66 80 80 87
worker 5 11 5 7 7 1 3 5 2 1 2 3 5 3 5

 

Although the above-mentioned statistics provides some sense of the occupational conditions in pre-Revolutionary Boston (and Philadelphia), it simply cannot capture the cultural conditions.  In order to accommodate that need, eyewitness accounts of how the people of Boston behaved during that period are very useful.  According to Thomas Jefferson, when the Bostonians first heard about England’s plan to close Boston harbor, they investigated old public statements that the Puritans had used during their Revolution, and they, “cooked up a resolution” (Jefferson, 1795) that modernized the older Puritan phrases.  Hence, June 1, 1774, the day that the Boston Port Bill went into effect, became, ‘a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer.’[27]  Clearly, the Bostonians did not take the news well.

One Bostonian in particular, George Robert Twelves Hewes (August 25, 1742-November 5, 1840) a poor shoemaker who was present at the Boston Massacre, participated directly in the Boston Tea Party, and later fought in the American Revolutionary War, describes how he felt: “[I] sat down for a few moments, and sought to allay the keenness of my grief by giving vent to a profusion of tears.”[28] Hewes was instrumental in the Boston Tea Party, where he voluntarily joined a group of, “organized…radical Whig leaders of Boston” (Young, 1999, pg. 42), disguised himself as an Indian, and painted his, “face and hands with coal dust in the ship of blacksmith.”  (Thatcher, 1835)  Considered by many historians as a forgotten hero of the American Revolution, Hewes’s letters and diaries do not provide any sort of quantitative data that might indicate his involvement in the Tea Party, nor does any of the data presented in this paper do him justice.  The Thwing database only lists his name once as single digit under the “occupation – shoemaker” category.  Indeed, the mere recognition of his name in the Thwing database does not even come close to recognizing Hewes’s contribution to American history.  Instead, Hewes’ contributions and heart wrenching experiences are found only in his letters, and in the interviews that he granted before his death in 1840, and they represent why historical research that utilizes quantitative data alone provides incomprehensive, and unsatisfying, results.

As the news of the Port Bill spread to other nations, it resulted in harsh words against the British.  Edmund Burke noted the injustice of punishing the entire town of Boston merely over the deeds of a few.  Burke warned of the dire consequences that would follow if the British were unsuccessful: the, “vexatious abortive experiment of drawing a revenue from America should be laid aside in favour of the ‘ancient policy’ of no taxation.”  (Burke, 1775) ? but Burke was British! Indeed, Burke was correct, and one of the consequences of the Port Bill was a dramatic drop in Boston’s (and Philadelphia’s) population.

The best method for determining the level that each occupation was affected is to run a number of queries from spreadsheet #1 (pgs. 27-30) on each specific occupation.

(Five different queries that focus on the five primary shipping related occupations in Boston are discussed below.)

The data contained in the above-mentioned tables provides broad information vis-à-vis the occupational conditions in Boston during the Revolutionary period, and it can be further applied to historical research by running queries on different fields that limit the information to specific categories.  For example, Query # 1 (below) displays the sum, average, minimum, and maximum number of mariner jobs in Boston in 1775.

Query #1-Sum, Average, Minimum, and Maximum of Boston Occupations – 1775

 

Sum Of 1775 Avg Of 1775 Min Of 1775 Max Of 1775
270 10 0 83

 

This sort of data might be useful for an extremely narrow analysis of occupations in that specific year.  However, in order to gage the effects of a political-economic law that is backed by military force, it is necessary to expand the scope of the study. Query #2 (below) focuses on a three-year period (1774-1775-1776) an offers a slightly broader view of the effects of the Boston Port Bill.

Query #2 – Average Boston Occupations 1774, 1775, 1776

 

Avg Of 1774 Avg Of 1775 Avg Of 1776
29.3703703703704 10 50.1851851851852

 

Although this type of query provides a somewhat broader view, it is still difficult to ascertain the long-term effects of the Bill.  Another approach might include a detailed query that displays a sum of the shipping and merchant occupations from 1770 to 1784 (below).

Query #3 – Average Boston Occupations 1774 to 1784

Occupation Avg Of 1770 Avg Of 1771 Avg Of 1772 Avg Of 1773 Avg Of 1774 Avg Of 1775 Avg Of 1776 Avg Of 1777 Avg Of 1778 Avg Of 1779 Avg Of 1780 Avg Of 1781 Avg Of 1782 Avg Of 1783 Avg Of 1784
blacksmith 34 40 39 38 42 6 33 24 20 31 33 24 37 34 41
boatbuilder 7 7 8 5 4 2 1 1 6 8 6 5 7 7 6
carpenter 12 11 10 15 16 3 7 11 9 14 11 11 15 11 18
caulker 3 6 4 8 4 0 2 3 0 5 3 3 6 11 6
fisherman 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 4 5 4 2 3 3 2 3
innholder 15 21 21 14 15 8 33 12 9 6 16 34 53 34 33
innkeeper 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 0 0 0 5 5 5 2 4
laborer 3 6 5 3 0 0 6 2 2 5 12 5 6 14 7
laborurer 11 9 11 13 0 0 12 6 6 10 9 7 12 16 9
mariner 127 110 110 117 97 28 84 61 61 111 105 122 140 122 156
merchant 263 290 284 289 275 83 828 157 167 245 210 251 356 303 402
midshipman 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
printer 18 14 21 20 12 7 16 1 9 10 7 7 10 11 11
retailer 46 42 43 50 66 18 97 46 49 40 48 95 190 71 69
ropemaker 18 24 24 24 26 10 15 8 12 13 11 17 26 15 27
shipbuilder 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
shipjoiner 5 7 8 5 6 3 5 5 4 7 4 5 9 5 4
shipwright 25 29 21 27 24 7 23 12 20 17 24 19 24 32 49
shopkeeper 74 62 58 65 67 17 61 45 46 52 52 57 86 63 79
sugarbaker 0 2 3 1 3 0 4 2 2 5 1 2 3 2 5
sugarboiler 1 4 3 2 0 0 4 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 2
tailor 49 40 54 64 47 10 29 28 24 48 39 29 49 43 54
taverner 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0
trader 39 38 45 52 35 11 47 30 41 49 58 66 80 80 87
wharfinger 13 7 14 16 8 4 10 8 11 9 11 10 15 19 15
worker 5 11 5 7 7 1 3 5 2 1 2 3 5 3 5
yeoman 27 28 35 0 33 44 26 26 24 21 29 44 52 47 69

 

As displayed in query #3, large amounts of data can be averaged and/or summed quickly in order to provide an accurate analysis of a particular period, and is therefore very useful in historical research.  However, unlike the vague amount of data in queries #1 and #2, and despite the fact that it narrows the number of occupations from 421 to 27, the amount of data in query #3 is still too broad if the goal is to analyze a very specific occupation.

Query # 4 (below) provides information on the average number of mariners, and it exemplifies a specific query that is run from table # 5 (below).  That sort of query is very useful to the historian who desires to analyze a specific occupation over a specified period because it narrows the criteria.  In this example, it demonstrates that between 1770 and 1784 the average number of mariners for any given year was 103.4.  By itself, that data is useless until it is compared to the total number if mariners in 1775 (Table # 4, record # 7), which indicates a substantial (72.81%) decrease as compared to the 14 year average, and supports the premise that the Boston Port Bill was truly devastating to the Bostonians in 1775.[29]

Query #4 – Sum and Average of Boston Mariners – 1770 to 1784

Occupation Sum Of Total Avg Of Total
Mariner 1551 103.4

 

Table # 3 – Boston Mariners – 1770 to 1784

 

ID Occupation Year Total
2 Mariner 1770 127
3 Mariner 1771 110
4 Mariner 1772 110
5 Mariner 1773 117
6 Mariner 1774 97
7 Mariner 1775 28
8 Mariner 1776 84
9 Mariner 1777 61
10 Mariner 1778 61
11 Mariner 1779 111
12 Mariner 1780 105
13 Mariner 1781 122
14 Mariner 1782 140
15 Mariner 1783 122
16 Mariner 1784 156

 

Similar queries can be performed repeatedly for all of the shipping-related occupations in Boston during 1775.  For example, query # 5 (below) is similar to query # 4 with the exception that is focuses on shipjoiners.

Query #5 – Sum and Average of Boston Shipjoiners – 1770 to 1784

 

Occupation Sum Of Total Avg Of Total
Shipjoiners 82 5.46666666666667

 

Table #6 – Boston Shipjoiners – 1770 to 1784

ID Occupation Year Total
2 Shipjoiners 1770 5
3 Shipjoiners 1771 7
4 Shipjoiners 1772 8
5 Shipjoiners 1773 5
6 Shipjoiners 1774 6
7 Shipjoiners 1775 3
8 Shipjoiners 1776 5
9 Shipjoiners 1777 5
10 Shipjoiners 1778 4
11 Shipjoiners 1779 7
12 Shipjoiners 1780 4
13 Shipjoiners 1781 5
14 Shipjoiners 1782 9
15 Shipjoiners 1783 5
16 Shipjoiners 1784 4

 

Once again, the abovementioned data is useful at providing information about the quantity of jobs lost, however, it simply cannot reveal the feelings of the people who lost those jobs, or where they settled once they moved.  Undoubtedly, both Boston’s and Philadelphia’s economy suffered, and on many farmsteads, production declined to subsistence levels because the, “primary labor force — fathers and sons — had journeyed off to war.”  (Neisser, 1776)  Likewise, merchants, artisans, and craftsmen temporarily ceased operations, and many supports of the Revolution, such as Jasper Yeates, who prayed to God that the rumors that Congress had, “a rough Draught of a Plan of Government…for the Colonies” was “not…well founded.” fled as far as Reading, Pennsylvania for safety.[30]  Yeates feared that, “it will become a horrid War indeed if an Independence is aimed at.”[31]  From those eyewitness testimony’s, it is clear that many people left the cities either to fight for their rights, or flee for their lives.  In any event, Boston’s population loss was in fact a gain for the post-Revolutionary economy.  By 1789, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had made thousands of wool and cotton cards a month, and in the town of Lynn, over 170,000 pairs of women’s shoes a year were being produced.[32]  Additionally, sailcloth, paper hangings, and glass were being produced by several local markets, which was significant not only to the local economy, but also in foreign markets, where Massachusetts merchants found a new place to sell their products. [33]  Consequently, it can be argued that the population did not actually decrease, but rather, it merely shifted from one region to another.  Moreover, the Boston Port Bill did not have crush the entire American economy as the British had planned; it only affected the economies of the largest cities, while at the same time, it stimulated the much smaller economies of the local towns and villages.

This paper has established that a comprehensive historical study is best facilitated by the inclusion of all available quantitative and qualitative data.  The testimony from Hewes, the Higgins letters, and the numerous newspaper articles offer a unique cultural snapshot of the conditions in Boston and Philadelphia during the Revolutionary War years, yet none of them provide specific data vis-à-vis the job market.  By contrast, Oestreicher and Nash provide a moderate amount of quantitative data vis-à-vis the job market in Philadelphia, yet the human story falls short.  Additionally, when used correctly, the information in the Thwing database can be used to confirm or dispute other analyses (such as the one provide by Oestreicher), yet it too offers little insight into Colonial American culture.  Moreover, the U.S. Census did not begin until 1790, and this paper has proven how difficult it is to obtain accurate population data before that period; indeed, this study does not represent the entire Bostonian population in 1774, nor could it be done with any degree of certainty, given the fact that women, children, and some minority groups were simply never accounted for. You’ve said all this before Consequently, the best historical method for recreating a place and its people is a collective effort of all pertinent data.  As this paper has demonstrated, the effects of the Boston Port Bill had a tremendous impact on all American’s, with the most significant effects on Boston.  However, those effects were short lived, and did not provide the British with the desired effect to ruin the American economy, Instead, it merely ignited an already tense situation, and if nothing else, represents how people behave when they are coerced.

You could have done with a stronger / clearer conclusion

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Alfred Young, (1999) The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution.

 

Boston: Beacon Press.

 

Boston Gazette, 7 April 1766 (Supplement), and Connecticut Courant, 7 April 1766.

Breen, T. H. (2004). The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American

 

            Independence. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

Camden, William, (1586) Britannia.

 

Cramer, Clarence H., American Enterprise, Free and Not So Free (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972),

 

  1. 82-83.

 

Deane, Sermon, p. 25; A Friend to Commerce, Independent Chronicle, June 2, 1785.

Frantz, John B. & Pencak, William Pencak; Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998

 

Hay Papers, July 1, 1775; George Neisser, trans., Moravian Diaries from the Congregation at

 

York, May 31, 1775 (Massachusetts Historical Society).

 

Jared Eliot (1760), Essays on Field Husbandry in New England.

 

Jasper Yeates to Edward Burd, 24 August 1775, Edward Burd Papers, HSP.

 

Jefferson to Maria Cosway, Sept. 8, 1795; to Mme. de Tessé, Sept. 6, 1795; both in Jefferson

 

Papers, LC.

 

Higginson Letters in Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 3rd series, VII.

 

Larabee, Benjamin W.,(1964) , The Boston Tea Party (New York: Oxford University Press).

 

Lock, F. P. (1998). Edmund Burke (Vol. 1). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

 

 

 

 

Nash, Gary, Smith, Billy G., and Hoerder, Dirk Hoerder,(1983) The Urban Crucible: Social

 

Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution Labor

 

History 24 (Summer).

 

New-London Gazette, 27 November 1767.

 

New-Hampshire Gazette, 10 August 1764, originally published in the Pennsylvania Journal, 28

 

June 1764.

 

O’Connor, T. H. (2001). The Hub: Boston Past and Present. (Boston: Northeastern University

 

Press).

 

Oestreicher, R. (1994). The Counted and the Uncounted: The Occupational Structure of Early

 

American Cities. Journal of Social History, 28(2).

 

Pennsylvania Gazette, 9 January 1766.

 

 

Tosh, John, The Pursuit of History (Longman, revised 3rd edition, 2003).

 

Thwing, A. H. (1920) The Crooked and Narrow Streets of the Town of Boston, 1630-1822.

 

The New England Historic Genealogical Society and the Massachusetts Historical

Society (Boston, Marshall Jones Co.)

Thwing, A. H. (1920) The Crooked and Narrow Streets of the Town of Boston, 1630-1822. The

New England Historic Genealogical Society and the Massachusetts Historical Society

 

(Boston, Marshall Jones Co.).

 

Ulrich, Laurel Thatcher, (1989), Daughters of Liberty: Religious Women in Revolutionary

 

New England in Women in the Age of the American Revolution, ed. Ronald Hoffman and

 

Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, Va., 1989), 211–43.

 

 

 

 

Young, Alfred F.,(1990), The Women of Boston in Harriet B. Applewhite and Darline G. Levy,

 

eds., Women and Politics in the Age of Democratic Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of

 

Michigan Press), 181-226.

 

Tiller, Kate (1998) Local History: The State of the Art (Univ. of Cambridge Board of

 

Continuing Education Occasional Paper).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Spreadsheet #1

Types and Total Numbers of Occupations in Boston – 1770 to 1784

 

accountant 2
actor 2
actress 1
alehouseheeper 3
anchorsmith 8
antiquarian 1
apothecary 55
apprentice 1
armourer 2
arrow
artist 4
assayer 1
attorney 4
auctioneer 29
axemaker 3
baker 187
barber 62
barrister 1
beavermaker 1
below
binder 10
biscuitbaker 1
blacksmith 219
blockmaker 65
blower 1
broadinghouse
boatbuilder 65
boatman 22
boatwright 6
bodice
bodicemaker 1
bodymaker 1
boiler 3
bondsman 2
bondecutter
bookbinder 24
bookkeeper 4
bookseller 91
boxmaker 1
brassfounder 5
braizer
breechesmaker 7
brewer 45
brickburner 8
bricklayer 153
brickmaker 14
brickmason 1
brightsmith 1
britchesmaker 1
broker 14
bushmaker 2
buckram 1
builder 4
butcher 95
buttolph 1
buttonmaker 1
cabinetmaker 52
cancooper 1
captain 4
cardmaker 13
carpenter 185
carrier
cartwright 1
carver 14
cashier 1
caulker 42
chairbodymaker 1
chairmaker 32
chandler 18
chanler 1
chief 1
chimnetsweep 14
chimneysweeper 3
chirurgeon 4
chocolategrinder 4
chocolatemaker 3
ciderman 1
clergyman 1
clerk 157
cloathworker 1
clockmaker 9
clogmaker 1
clothier 28
clothmaker 1
clothworker 2
coachman 3
coachmaker 8
coaster 7
cobbler 1
collarmaker 4
collector 2
combmaker 3
comissary 1
confectioner 1
constable 2
contractor 1
controller 1
cook 6
cookshop 2
cookshopkeeper 1
coopersmith 11
corder 2
cordwainer 292
cordwinder 1
corker 2
council 1
counselor 1
cowkeeper 2
crockery 1
crockeryware 2
culler 1
currier 26
cutler 9
dancingmaster 7
dealer 8
dentist 2
diplomatist 1
director 1
dishturner 1
distiller 168
doctor 2
draper 9
dresser 16
driver 1
drummer 1
dyer 7
engineer 3
engraver 6
farmer 13
farrier 11
fellmonger 13
fellow 1
feltmaker 92
ferryman 7
fisherman 50
fishhookmaker 1
fishmonger 1
flaxdresser 1
founder 9
framemaker 1
fruiterer 1
furrier 2
gardener 15
gentleman 350
gentlewoman 7
glassmaker 1
glazier 54
glovermaker 2
glovermaker 1
gluemaker 3
goldsmith 107
governor 13
gravedigger 7
grinder 3
grocer 18
gunmaker 1
gunner 2
gunsmith 32
haberdasher 4
hairdresser 20
hammersmith 1
harvard 3
hatboxmaker 1
hatmaker 8
hatter 61
hayweigher 1
headbuilder 3
heelmaker 6
housecarpenter 17
housejoioner 5
housekeeper 1
housewright 503
huckster 2
husbandman 46
innholder 350
innkeeper 61
inspector 2
instrumentmaker 9
irondealer 1
ironmonger 17
jackmaker 1
jappaner 9
jeweller 16
joiner 146
journalist 1
journeyman 3
judge 6
keeper 14
kegmaker 6
king 1
laborer 174
labourer 6
lamplighter 1
lapidary 1
lastmaker 20
lawyer 53
leatherbreechesmaker 2
leatherdresser 57
lemondealer 3
lemonseller 4
lighterman 19
limeburner 5
linendraper 2
linenwebster 1
linguist 1
livery 1
locksmith 7
limbermerchant 1
machinsit 1
magician 1
maagistrate 2
maid 2
maidservant 1
maker 20
maltster 11
manufactorer 1
manufacturer 1
mariner 1544
mason 101
mastbuilder 27
mathematician 2
mealeman 1
merchant 1975
messenger 1
midshipman 1
midwife 1
milliner 6
milwright 5
minaturepainter 1
minister 177
mortgager 1
muscian 3
mustardmaker 1
nailer 6
needlemaker 1
netbraider 1
notary 2
nurse 3
oarmaker 7
officer 3
organist 1
owner 1
packer 3
painter 64
painterstainer 5
panelmaker 1
papermaker 5
paperstainer 3
parchmentmaker 1
pastor 2
pattenmaker 1
paver 8
pavier 1
patmaster 2
pearlashmaker 1
peddler 1
pedler 1
pemaquid 1
periwigmaker 19
perukemaker 37
pweterer 25
philosopher 1
physician 142
pilot 2
pinmaker 1
pipemaker 1
pipestave 1
pirate 1
plaisterer 1
planer 1
planter 24
plasterer 4
plumber 3
poet 5
porter 27
postmaster 5
potashboiler 1
potter 9
poundkeepr 1
president 2
priest 1
principal 1
printer 83
prisonkeeper 2
privateer 1
professor 1
publician 25
publisher 3
pumpmaker 6
purser 1
ratailer 1
refiner 6
representatives 1
restorator 1
retailer 1243
retainer 2
rider 1
rigger 16
ropemaker 96
saddler 33
sailmaker 60
sailor 2
salesman 1
saltboiler 2
schoolmaster 65
schoolmistress 2
schoolteacher 2
scientist 2
scorerer 1
scourer 1
sculptor 2
seacaptain 2
sealer 1
seaman 53
seargemaker 1
seamstress 9
semaster 1
servant 1213
sexton 10
shaymaker 1
shearman 1
sheriff 1
shinglemaker 1
shipbuiilder 12
shipcarpenter 20
shipcaulker 1
shipchangler 10
shipjoiner 34
shipmaster 10
ship’s 1
shipwright 344
shoarman 1
shoemaker 74
shopjoiner 2
shopkeeper 508
shoreman 1
silkdyer 5
silversmith 13
simpstress 1
slaymaker 3
sleighmaker 3
smallworkcooper 1
smith 10
soapboiler 13
soapmaker 1
soldier 3
sparmaker 1
spinner 1
spinstriss 1
spoonmaker 1
stablekeeper 2
stagecoach 1
stainer 11
starchmaker 3
statesman 1
stationer 36
staymaker 9
stiffner 1
stiller 1
stockbroker 1
stockingweaver 1
stonecutter 11
stonemason 1
storekeeper 2
stuccoworker 2
student 1
sugarbaker 22
sugarboiler 12
sugarrefiner 4
surgeon 49
surveyor 1
tailor 371
tailoress 1
tallow 12
tallowchandler 42
tanner 83
taverner 41
tavernkeeper 34
tea 2
ticketporter 14
tidesman 1
tinman 8
tinner 1
tinplateworker 1
tobacconsit 35
toolmaker 3
towncaulker 1
townclerk 1
toyseller 1
trader 236
tradesman 3
treasurer 1
truckman 37
trunkmaker 1
twinespinner 2
undertaker 2
upholsterer 23
varnisher 1
victualler 77
waiter 2
waldron 1
watchcleaner 1
watchmaker 13
watchman 1
waterman 3
weaver 39
wharfinger 61
wheelwright 24
whipmaker 1
whitesmith 6
wigmaker 22
winecooper 10
winemerchant 3
wineseller 3
woolendraper 1
worker 23
worsted 1
worstedcomber 4
writer 3
writingmaster 1
yeoman 351
13608
Total = 421

 

 

[1] see O’Connor, T. H. (2001). The Hub: Boston Past and Present. Boston: Northeastern University Press., pg. 175-179

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] see Clarence H. Cramer, American Enterprise, Free and Not So Free (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 82-83;

also Benjamin W. Labaree, The Boston Tea Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964)

[5] see Brian Gardner, The East India Company (New York: McCall Publishing, 1972).

[6] Higginson Letters in Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 3rd series, VII  (Boston, 1838), pg. 209

[7] Pennsylvania Gazette, 9 January 1766.

[8] New-London Gazette, 27 November 1767.

[9]  Ibid.

[10] Ibid

[11] New-Hampshire Gazette, 10 August 1764, originally published in the Pennsylvania Journal, 28 June 1764.

[12] see Breen, T. H. (2004). The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence.

New York: Oxford University Press.

[13] Boston Gazette, 7 April 1766 (Supplement), and Connecticut Courant, 7 April 1766. Also see Alfred F. Young,

“The Women of Boston: ‘Persons of Consequence’ in the Making of the American Revolution,” in Women

and Politics in the Age of Democratic Revolution, ed. Harriet B. Applewhite and Darline G. Levy (Ann

Arbor, Mich., 1990), 181–226; and Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, “‘Daughters of Liberty’: Religious Women in

Revolutionary New England,” in Women in the Age of the American Revolution, ed. Ronald Hoffman and

Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, Va., 1989), 211–43.

 

 

[14] see Breen, T. H. (2004). The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence.

New York: Oxford University Press.

[15] see Oestreicher, R. (1994). The Counted and the Uncounted: The Occupational Structure of Early American

Cities. Journal of Social History, 28(2).

[16] Gary Nash, Billy G. Smith, and Dirk Hoerder, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and

the Origins of the American Revolution  Labor History 24 (Summer 1983): 414-439.

[17] Information obtained from session 3; course material.

[18] Charles Phythian-Adams recognized the limitations of local historical research, and suggested that local historians

consider the place of his or her subject in a wider societal context.[18]

[19] William Camden, Britannia, (1586)

[20] Session 1.3, Oxford course pack, Tudor and Stuart antiquarians and the rise of country history

[21] Tiller, Kate (1998) ‘Local History: The State of the Art’ (Univ. of Cambridge Board of Continuing Education

Occasional Paper)

[22] Information obtained from session 2, course material.

[23] Thwing, A. H. (1920) The Crooked and Narrow Streets of the Town of Boston, 1630-1822. The New England Historic Genealogical Society and the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, Marshall Jones Co.)

[24] Ibid.

[25] Thwing, A. H. (1920) The Crooked and Narrow Streets of the Town of Boston, 1630-1822. The New England Historic Genealogical Society and the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, Marshall Jones Co.)

[26] Thwing, A. H. (1920) The Crooked and Narrow Streets of the Town of Boston, 1630-1822. The New England

Historic Genealogical Society and the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, Marshall Jones Co.)

[27] Jefferson to Maria Cosway, Sept. 8, 1795; to Mme. de Tessé, Sept. 6, 1795; both in Jefferson Papers, LC.

[28] see Alfred Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution. Boston: Beacon

Press, 1999.

 

[29] Thwing, A. H. (1920) The Crooked and Narrow Streets of the Town of Boston, 1630-1822 .The New England Historic Genealogical Society and the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, Marshall Jones Co.)

 

[30] John B. Frantz, William Pencak; Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.

[31] Jasper Yeates to Edward Burd, 24 August 1775, Edward Burd Papers, HSP.

[32] Deane, Sermon, p. 25; ‘A Friend to Commerce,’ Independent Chronicle, June 2, 1785.

[33] Ibid.

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