Stephen Andrew Kovach
Publication year: 2009

A study by the University of Michigan (2001) asserts that a lack of clearly defined legislature in post-apartheid South Africa permitted Engen, South Africa’s largest petrochemical manufacturer, to prevent the equitable distribution of certain public goods (clean air and water) by allowing it to emit high levels of air-bourn toxic chemicals without serious legal consequence.  Consequently, post-apartheid citizens of the South Durban region suffer from high incidence and prevalence rates of cancer, asthma, and severe chest pain, particularly in school-aged children.[1]  Michigan’s case study provides significant epidemiological evidence to support its claim; however, it fails to identify the economic and political sources that created such an environment because it does not utilize an appropriate method of analyzing South Africa’s political economy.  Without this type of data, policymakers are unable to determine an effective policy prescription capable of providing unfettered access to public goods in South Africa.  In conjunction with the notion that clean air and water are non-excludable public goods that all citizens are entitled to, this essay suggests that foreign direct investment (FDI) that conflicts with the equitable distribution of these goods is inconsistent with international environmental laws, and therefore requires policy change.  This paper analyzes post-apartheid FDI in the South Durban region of South Africa as it pertains to carcinogenic toxins produced by Engen from four different perspectives: the domestic societal, the domestic institutional, the international economic, and the international political.  Doing so advances the University of Michigan (UOM) findings by demonstrating that the struggle of low-income groups in South Africa stems from the absence of a bureaucratic administrative agency that is capable of contending with external pressures associated with international economic and domestic institutional forces.

South Africa’s (SA) emerging market economy consists of a plentiful supply of natural resources, a well developed financial, legal, communications, and transport network, a top-ranked stock exchange, and a modern infrastructure that is capable of efficiently distributing goods to regional urban centers.  Nevertheless, SA also suffers from high unemployment, overwhelming economic problems, and severe instances of environmental pollution and disease.  The most likely causes of these problems are (1) changes in governmental policy designed to promote rapid macroeconomic growth through aggressive FDI, and (2) a notable lack of political-economic influence among low-income South Africans, both of which contribute to South Africa’s current political-economic environment.  Jointly, these conditions have resulted in a disproportionate distribution of public goods.  To what extent do changes in governmental policies affect FDI to the point where public goods are negatively affected?  According to Fieldhouse (2000), FDI is, theoretically, “in the best interests of host countries, while…corporations, [and] the way in which they operate may be disadvantageous to the host.”  (Fieldhouse, 2000, pg. 170)  In accordance with this view, this paper focuses on the following potential disadvantages associated with FDI: the way in which MNC’s such as Engen react to (and exploit) changes in governmental policy, the negative effect it has on a host nation’s environment (pollution), and its affects on issues pertaining to environmental justice.  Broadly defined, environmental justice refers to the processes through which a government and its legal system handles socioeconomic and political inequalities within low-income and minority communities that typically arise from corporate and industrial activity and development.[2]  Regardless of race, gender, or income, all individuals possess the natural right to reasonable and meaningful involvement in issues concerning the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies because it is these issues that determine the quality (and distribution) of public goods such as air and water.  A recurring theme that binds the political, socioeconomic, and epidemiological issues of environmental justice is sustainable development: the balancing of environmental, political, economic, and social conditions that, “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”[3]  As a result, this paper will call attention to conditions in South Durban that are inconsistent with sustainability; doing so represents areas where governmental policies have affected FDI, and where FDI and public goods overlap.

In 2001, UOM published a case study titled: South African Environmental Justice Struggles Against “Toxic” Petrochemical Industries in South Durban:  The Engen Refiner Case.[4]  This case explores the South Durban community’s struggle against disproportionate exposure to toxic air-bourn chemicals such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) and benzene, two established carcinogens.  It argues that apartheid politics in South Africa between 1950 and 1994 created a political-economic environment that post-apartheid MNC’s such as Engen exploited, thus resulting in a severe health hazard in South Durban.[5]  It examines the effectiveness of the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA), and other non-governmental activist organizations, and the environmental and legal responsibilities of Engen.  The case study’s conclusion, that Engen officials colluded with apartheid politicians for economic gain at the expense of low-income black and Indian communities, is consistent with the above-mentioned definition of violations of environmental justice.[6]

This paper does not refute UOM’s findings that Engen exploited post-apartheid zoning strategies, or that it gained financially from the limited political-economic influence of low-income individuals.  However, the Michigan case study (1) provides an incomplete history of apartheid in South Durban; and (2) fails to utilize an effective method for analyzing the political and economic conditions that contributed to the development of South Africa’s current environmental policies.  As a result, the Michigan case study also concluded that the central problem with South African environmental legislature is the lack of clearly defined legislation capable of controlling pollution.[7]  Nonetheless, the South African Constitution explicates social, economic, and environmental rights.  Specifically, Section 24 of the South African Bill of Rights (a component of the Constitution) states that everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to his or her health or well-being.[8]  Moreover, present and future generations of South African’s have the Constitutional right to have their environment protected through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and ecological degradation.[9]  In short, the South African Constitution clearly denotes ecological and environmental rights, thus suggesting that SA should epitomize superior environmental conditions.  Thus, this paper asserts that the primary cause for the lack of enforcement vis-à-vis environmental laws is not poorly defined legislature, but rather, the lack of a bureaucratic agency that is legally capable of enforcing the law, similar to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Currently, South Africa relies on numerous special interest groups that possess a significant lack of political and economic influence, and are therefore incapable of imposing penalties on MNC’s that violate environmental laws.  Consequently, MNC’s such as Engen are able to operate in an unfettered political-economic environment without fear of legal prosecution.  The following historical account of the apartheid era explains which political and economic circumstances occurred during the apartheid era to create this type of environment.

The defeat by the British in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) gave Afrikaners (ethnic white South African settlers) significant post-war concessions, the most notable being the relinquishment of internal political control.[10]  By 1948, Afrikaners passed numerous laws that resulted in apartheid: a rigid system of racial segregation that excluded black citizens from jobs, voting, and education through a brutal police system designed to uphold segregation policies.[11]  Although Afrikaners touted segregation as the ultimate solution to the racial problem, it was in fact designed to ensure a political and economic monopoly over all non-white races in South Africa.[12]  In 1950, the Groups Area Act, an important corner stone of the apartheid system, provided both the financial and legal resources needed to segregate the South Durban (and other) communities from white neighborhoods.[13]  Afrikaners denied all forms of black protest, declared the African National Congress (ANC) illegal, and it imprisoned African leaders such as Nelson Mandela.[14]  The government justified its repression by labeling all black protests as communist-inspired, and by playing on the racial fears of the white minority.  By the late 1980’s, tensions grew in South Africa, and the international community boycotted South African exports, thus affecting its economy, and negatively affecting its ability to trade freely in the international community for nearly a decade.  In 1994, F. W. de Klerk, a moderate Afrikaner leader, successfully negotiated for equal voting and other rights, thus triggering a series of events that resulted in the release of Nelson Mandela, the right for peaceful mass demonstrations, and ultimately, the enfranchisement of all adult South Africans for the 1994 elections.[15]

The end of apartheid marks the beginning of new struggles for low-income and minority groups in SA for the following reasons.  Newly democratizing nations present lucrative investment opportunities that often attract large inflows of FDI.[16]  As FDI flowed into the South African economy, numerous transnational industrial plants developed, many of which took advantage of SA’s poorly constructed environmental laws by developing industrial and petrochemical plants in low-income neighborhoods such as South Durban.  In turn, South Durban citizens faced exposure to pollutants and toxins such as SO2 and benzene, thus resulting in a sizeable increase in cancer and asthma.[17]  At the same time, the South African government faced the challenge of growing its economy in a manner consistent with the demands of globalization.  Consequently, in exchange for macroeconomic growth, the South African government adopted loosely constructed domestic environmental laws as it pertains to the corporate behavior of MNC’s.  Increasing inflows of FDI, combined with the goal of establishing SA’s position in the growing worldwide capitalist economy, created transnational companies such as Engen: a Malaysian-owned petrochemical plant located adjacent to low-income communities, and one of the two largest sources of SO2 in South Durban.

The above-mentioned history of apartheid and its effects on South Durban explains how the current political environment and it effects on environmental laws allowed MNC’s to operate without checks and balances.  Although Constitutional rights are typically the key to environmental protection in most democratic societies, without enforcement such laws are practically useless.  For instance, the U.S. also has a history of environmental pollution in low-income regions; nevertheless, it is far better equipped (and more successful at) preventing and resolving severe, prolonged instances of toxic exposure as compared to SA because of bureaucratic agencies, such as the EPA, who are legally capable of enforcing environmental laws, and punishing those who violate them.[18]  By contrast, SA relies on non-governmental agencies (NGO) and special interest groups who struggle with funding and who have extremely limited political and economic power.  As a result, there are no governmental agencies working on the behalf of the low-income and minority groups in SA; thus, transnational companies such as Engen continually violate environmental laws without serious consequence.  From the domestic societal perspective, forces, such as the demands of, “individuals, firms, and groups,” (Frieden and Lake, 2004, pg. 9) determine national policy.  This perspective suggests that pressures imposed by socioeconomic groups form a nation’s political economy.  Indeed, if this perspective were correct, groups such as SDCEA would play a major role in forming national policy in SA, thus requiring Engen to reduce its SO2 output from 82 tons to internationally acceptable standards of 2 tons per day.  Hence, this paper suggests that in this particular case, the domestic societal perspective does not sufficiently explain the development and formation of SA’s post-apartheid national policies because NGO’s have not been instrumental in forming the national political economy.

The advancement of Western democratization in SA (and similar undeveloped nations) is a strong component of U.S. foreign policy.  Large international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank share in America’s goal of establishing democracy worldwide, largely through the development of free trade.[19]  In particular, the IMF attempts to resolve serious economic issues by providing economic relief to financially distraught nations in exchange for a commitment to reform its macroeconomic policy and restructure its systems.  Shortly before the end of apartheid, the IMF had lent money to SA in exchange for reforms that would end apartheid politics and usher in democracy.  However, this did not benefit the low-income and minority communities because, according to Root and Wiley (2000), democracy practiced at the local level differs from that at the national level; thus, organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank are often ineffective in developing change as it pertains to public goods.[20]  Root et al. asserts that the IMF and the World Bank emphasize national policies over local policies because the former involves large-scale sustainable development, which in turn enhances free trade, while the latter, which supports the causes of grass roots organizations and special interest groups, does little to enhance free trade at the macroeconomic level, and is therefore overlooked.[21]  Thus, local groups are unable to compete with large transnational organizations in matters concerning environmental justice because they simply lack the political power or international support needed to advance their cause.  Specifically, SDCEA and other NGO’s lacked political power sufficient to compete with Engen, who derives its power from its close relationships with the African National Congress.[22]  In many ways, this relationship is similar to those that existed between Asian bankers and governmental officials in Indonesia before the 1997 Asian crisis in the sense that it creates a powerful alliance between corporate leaders and policymakers that low-income individuals often find themselves unable to compete against in matters concerning the fair and equitable distribution of public goods.

In an attempt to compete against the ecological impacts of Western democratization, South African grassroots organizations and environmental NGO’s developed forums and consultative committees designed to enhance the power of those most affected by poverty and environmental degradation.[23]  For example, citizens in South Durban created the SO2 Steering Committee, whose primary goal is to discuss environmental conditions and sustainable development with local politicians and Engen representatives.[24]  The domestic societal perspective suggests that these efforts should have been effective at evoking change because such groups determine a nation’s policies.  However, these groups were in fact unsuccessful at forcing Engen to reduce SO2 production from 84 to 2 tons per day.  Notably, these committees sparked a movement that prompted SA’s three largest cities (including Durban) to adopt Local Agenda (LA 21), a UN run program that focuses on sustainable development.[25]  The Durban municipal government envisioned LA 21 as a, “people-centered process that provides meaningful opportunities to develop partnerships for change,” thus giving hope to South Durban residents.[26]  (ICLEI, 1995)  Despite their good intentions, however, environmental forums received lower priority and had virtually no political influence, nor did they possess enforcement power.[27]  Hence, Engen did not reduce its SO2 production, mostly because compliance was optional, thus indicating that domestic groups were unable to form national policy sufficiently to promote political or economic change.

In addition to the previously mentioned environmental problems in SA that result from the governments inability to enforce its own constitutional laws, pressures of neo-liberal economic policies that stem from Western democratization imposed added pressure on low-income and minority groups.  The South African government’s ambitious goal of adopting neo-liberal economic policies and encouraging FDI prompted the government to, “remove trade barriers much faster than the IMF suggested.”  (Padayachee, 1996, pg. 369)  In June 1996, the government divulged a macroeconomic strategy designed to promote growth, create jobs, and improve SA’s competitiveness in world markets.  The government’s strategy reduced spending on social services (in order to meet budget targets); it liberalized the financial, labor, and trade markets; and it sought foreign investors.[28]  In short, the government fast-tracked development through Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI), and it removed regulatory obstacles by promising tax breaks to investors.  Accordingly, macroeconomic growth increased, but only at the expense of developing a governmental system that was simply incapable of handling the environmental disasters that it was simultaneously creating in South Durban.  These external economic pressures support the international economic perspective on how a nation’s political economy formulates.  According to Frieden and Lake (2004), the manner in which a nation’s political economy develops depends largely on external constraints and, “global socioeconomic factors.”  (Frieden and Lake, 2004, pg. 8)  Specifically, developments in, “technology, telecommunications, finance, and production fundamentally affect the setting within which national governments make policy.”  (Frieden, et al. 2004, pg. 8)  Frieden et al. suggests that these developments matter to national government’s to the point where policy choices are nearly, “impossible to implement and others so attractive as to be impossible to resist.”  (Frieden, et al., 2004, pg. 8)  Associated with these developments are the ebb and flow of foreign capital, and its implications to FDI.  For instance, since the end of apartheid in 1994, foreign investor confidence levels has increased steadily to account for a significant increase in FDI as a percentage of GDP (currently, average flows of FDI in SA averages one percent of GDP.)[29]  Although one percent is relatively low as compared to other developing economies, it represents a significant increase as compared to pre-1994 numbers, where FDI nearly came to a standstill as divestment (concentrated economic boycott designed to pressure governmental change) from SA took hold in many Western nations as a means of fighting apartheid.  Between 1985 and 1990, divesture from SA resulted in capital flight of hot money (capital that investors can withdraw quickly via electronic transactions) out of SA in the sum of nearly 28 billon Rand.  Consequently, the South African currency succumbed to a significant decline in its international exchange rate, which in turn increased the cost of imports, thus resulting in 12-15% annual inflation.  These harsh economic conditions prompted the South African government to prohibit its citizens from withdrawing capital, and required foreign inventors to withdraw funds only in rand, which was trading at a nearly 40% discount to the dollar; thus companies that attempted to divest would receive fewer dollars comparatively.[30]  However, these measures failed to resolve the problems associated with apartheid because the international economic pressures placed on the SA government were sufficient to evoke change in national policy in SA by ending apartheid.  Hence, in this particular situation, the international economic perspective sufficiently explains how a nation’s political economy formulates.

Since 1994, SA has rebounded from apartheid politics in terms of per capita GDP ($13,300 2006 est.), technological advancements, and financial strength; however, it still suffers from severe environmental problems.  For example, SA has an advanced and comprehensive financial regulation system, as evidenced by its top-ranked stock exchange (currently ranked in the top 10 worldwide).  Nevertheless, it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism vis-à-vis environmental law.  Thus, from a regulatory perspective, it is safer for South Africans to trade a stock on the Johannesburg exchange than it is for them to breathe the air or drink the water because the former has legal recourse if they lose money due to bad corporate behavior while the latter has no recourse if they acquire cancer due to bad corporate behavior.  Indeed, overregulation, and its associated costs and benefits, could negatively affect sustainability by preventing economic growth; however, under-regulation has the opposite affect in the sense that low-income and minority groups suffer because there are no governmental organizations supporting sustainability.  Moreover, there is currently no plan to develop a compelling regulatory agency designed to assess and account for regulation on a cost-benefit basis.[31]  This is precisely where the gap between environmental law and enforcement occurs; thus, the absence of a regulatory agency capable of conducting and assessing an accurate cost-benefit analysis of Engen’s business practices places low-income and minority groups at a disadvantage in terms of public goods.

Until the South African government establishes an EPA-equivalent agency, South African’s must rely on NGO’s and special interest groups in order to advance their cause.  Currently, SA has seven environmental NGO’s whose combined annual operating budget is less than one-fifth that of the EPA’s.[32]  In real currency, this equates to, “1-2% of total (South African) government expenditures.”[33]  Moreover, because NGO’s have virtually no political power, they must continually seek new financing in order to advance their cause.  In short, NGO’s are the weaker part of a triumvirate, (or third sector) designed to counter the other two actors, the state and the market.[34]  Indeed, NGO’s are much weaker than federal agencies, as evidence by their inability to enforce environmental laws in South Durban.[35]  In fact, the best that NGO’s have been able to accomplish is (1) to deny Engen a public-relations victory by refusing to sign environmental agreements, and (2) to keep Engen’s pollution history in the view of the nation.[36]  Although Engen originally agreed to several of the NGO’s demands, it did not agree to its key demand to reduce SO2 emissions because its emission levels did not violate South African law.  In its defense, Engen contested international standards, and supported its argument with a different set of environmental measurements from Malaysia, who invested $436 million in FDI in the early 1990’s, and has substantially lower emission output standards.[37]  That Engen was able to argue effectively against international emission standards, and maintain its industrial operations to its benefit coincides with the domestic institutional perspective on how a nation’s political economy formulates.  The domestic institutional perspective suggests that forces, such as the policies of national policymakers and their associated institutions, play a significant role in determining a nation’s political economy.  Given that Engen continued with its daily operation without legal opposition suggests that, in this particular situation, domestic institutions possess political and economic power sufficient to form national policy, particularly when compared to domestic societal forces, which in this case, were virtually ineffective.

The Michigan case study found that Engen’s daily production of 82 tons of SO2 exceeds the 2 tons permitted by the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI): the public EPA database that contains information on permissible levels of toxic chemical releases and other waste management activities.[38]  The TRI inventory was established with U.S. government funding under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), and it was further expanded by the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990.  According to the EPA, the TRI is one of several similar programs established, (or being established), by countries around the world, with the exception of SA, which has yet to indicate its intent to abide by this international measurement.[39]  There are two primary reasons why the South African government has not agreed to conform to TRI standards: (1) doing so results in lower industrial output, and therefore lower macroeconomic growth; and (2) the South African government have not established an agency equivalent to the EPA.  Thus, without an EPA-equivalent in SA, there are literally no government-sponsored organizations capable of understanding the complexities of chemical analysis; creating laws that are in the public’s best interest; and enforcing those laws sufficiently to require violators such as Engen to comply.  As a result, SA’s industrial output is inconsistent with TRI standards.  Collectively, the UN and other above-mentioned geopolitical forces that construct international environmental laws typically place pressure on a developing country when it violates industrial output standards.  From the international political perspective, geopolitical forces such as these create a desire among developing nations to participate in the world’s economy.  However, in this particular case, international environmental laws created by the international political community were ineffective at forming SA’s political economy because neither the South African government nor Engen heeded those laws.  Instead, they colluded in order to achieve corporate and macroeconomic gains, albeit international political pressures to reduce emissions.  Thus, the international political perspective does not explain sufficiently the formation of SA’s political economy.

As previously mentioned, UOM’s case study argues that Engen’s corporate behavior caused a dramatic increases in cancer and asthma in South Durban.  In order to support its claim, the case study provides substantial epidemiological data on the health-related conditions of the citizens in South Durban.  For instance, as of 2005, the citizens of South Durban (population 280,000) succumbed to disproportionately higher incidence and prevalence rates of cancer, asthma, and severe chest pain as compared to other South African towns.[40]  Other research supports this data.  For example, in 1994, Merebank, a community in South Durban, reported that school students exhibited three times the normal rate of chronic coughs, chest congestion, and persistent wheezing as compared to students located in other towns.[41]  In 1996, a study conducted by Diab and Preston-Whyte concluded that South Durban has one of the highest ambient levels of SO2 in the country.[42]  In 2002, a medical study conducted by the Nelson Mandela School of Medicine found that 52% of students and teachers at a primary school bordering the Engen plant suffered from asthma.[43]  The EPA, the Center for Disease Control, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Agency for Research on Cancer concurs that SO2 causes asthma, while a population-based case-control study from Canada suggested an increased risk for cancer in men exposed to SO2.[44]  The conclusions of these studies indicate that there is adequate evidence for carcinogenicity in humans of SO2, sulfites, bisulfites and metabisulfites, and limited evidence for carcinogenicity in experimental animals of SO2.[45]  In addition, WHO indicates many potential pathways for carcinogens to enter the human body, including air, soil, meat, milk, water, and fish.[46]  Thus, it is highly possible that the citizens of South Durban are contracting cancer from multiple sources, all of which are considered public goods. In order to gain a better understanding of the ecological conditions in SA immediately before apartheid ended, this paper utilized a blended methodological approach by analyzing a large data set from a survey conducted by UOM in 1994 (nine months before apartheid ended) with STATA statistical software.  The survey, which represents a joint venture by UOM, and the Stimulating Research in Population Studies and Demography in Southern Africa (SALDRU), observes the health and occupational conditions of 43,987 individuals living in 8,854 households in SA.[47]  The fifty-four page household survey identifies self-reported cancer and asthma rates in SA.  The results indicate that in 1994, 0.0008% of individuals on the survey reported having cancer.  As compared to the number of individuals living with cancer in SA in 2005, (0.001% of the population), the data indicates an increase of .0002% (or an additional 8,000 cases annually) in ten years.[48]

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned biological facts, all of which indicates that Engen is responsible for the increase in cancer and asthma in South Durban, identifying the biological causes of a disease does not necessarily help policymakers when determining how to control the current situation, or how to prevent future occurrences in other developing nations.  UOM’s case study fails to identify these causes because it does not utilize an appropriate methodology for analyzing a nation’s political economy.  Consequently, this paper identifies the political and economic causes that permitted Engen to exploit SA as being international economic forces that placed pressure on the South African government, and the domestic institutional pressures of MNC’s such as Engen, who possessed significant political and economic power over the low-income citizens.  Increased integration into the global economy has affected SA’s political economy by reshaping how local communities must respond to environmental problems that result when governments permit MNC’s to operate without regulation.  Indeed, the end of apartheid and the push towards Western democratization has created a new period of turbulence in SA, one that permits all citizens to voice publicly their opinions, but also one that permits transnational corporations such as Engen to violate their civil rights.  This paper has also demonstrated that the key to environmental justice in SA is good governance through the development of a bureaucratic agency similar to the EPA.  Without an effective governmental agency that is empowered to create and enforce environmental laws, companies such as Engen are likely to continue to operate in the gray area.  Although UOM’s case study accurately identifies a severe case of environmental justice in South Durban, its inability to identify the political and economic causes that allowed Engen violate internationally accepted pollution laws does not help policymakers who strive to create effective policies that address inequality.  Thus, policymakers require data from various sources in order to develop policies in developing countries that support the equitable distribution of public goods.



















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[2] see Bowen, W. M. (2001). Environmental Justice through Research-Based Decision-Making. New York: Garland.

[3] United Nations. (1987). Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. General Assembly

Resolution 42/187, 11 December 1987.

[4] Maguranyanga, B.. South African Environmental Justice Struggles Against “Toxic” Petrochemical Industries in South Durban: The Engen Refinery Case. University of Michigan.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] South African Constitution, Section 24, Environment, Bill of Rights

[9] Ibid.

[10]  see Eades, L. M. (1999). The End of Apartheid in South Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

[11]  Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Frieden, J. A., & Lake, D. A. (2000). International Political Economy: Perspectives on

Global Power and Wealth. London: Routledge.

[17] Maguranyanga, B.. South African Environmental Justice Struggles Against “Toxic” Petrochemical Industries in South Durban: The Engen Refinery Case. University of Michigan.

[18] Wailoo, K. (2001). Dying In the City Of The Blues: Sickle Cell Anemia and the Politics of Race and Health. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.

[19] Mead, W.R. (2000). Special Providence. Routledge. London.

[20] Root, C., & Wiley, D.. Globalization, Democratization, and the Environment in the New South Africa: Social Movements, Corporations, and the State of South Durban. In W. L. Goldfrank, D. Goodman, & A. Szasz (Eds.), Ecology and the World-System (pp. 213-265). Greenwood Press.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.


[27] Root, C., & Wiley, D.(2000). Globalization, Democratization, and the Environment in the New South Africa: Social Movements, Corporations, and the State of South Durban. In W. L. Goldfrank, D. Goodman, & A. Szasz (Eds.), Ecology and the World-System (pp. 213-265). Greenwood Press.

[28] Ibid.


[30] Richard Knight. Sanctioning Apartheid (Africa World Press), 1990

[31] Root, C., & Wiley, D.. Globalization, Democratization, and the Environment in the New South Africa: Social Movements, Corporations, and the State of South Durban. In W. L. Goldfrank, D. Goodman, & A. Szasz (Eds.), Ecology and the World-System (pp. 213-265). Greenwood Press.

[32] South African Environmental NGO’s include the North West Parks & Tourism Board Honorary Officer

Association, the Friends of the Pilansberg, Earthlife Africa, the Koeberg Alert, the Cape Town Ecology

Group, the Wildlife and Environmental Society of South Africa, and the Nelson Mandela Bay Local



[34] Princen, T., & Finger, M. (1994). Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global.

London: Routledge

[35] Goldfrank, W. L., Goodman, D., & Szasz, A. (Eds.). (1999). Ecology and the World-System. Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press.

[36] Root, C., & Wiley, D.. Globalization, Democratization, and the Environment in the New South Africa: Social Movements, Corporations, and the State of South Durban. In W. L. Goldfrank, D. Goodman, & A. Szasz (Eds.), Ecology and the World-System (pp. 213-265). Greenwood Press.

[37] Ibid.


[39] Ibid.

[40] Maguranyanga, B.. South African Environmental Justice Struggles Against “Toxic” Petrochemical Industries in South Durban: The Engen Refinery Case. University of Michigan.

[41] Kistnasamy, M. B. 1994. The Relationship between Location of Residency and Respiratory Symptoms of Primary

School Pupils. Unpublished manuscript. 1994)

[42] Diab, Roseanne, and Rob Preston-Whyte. 1996. Air. In Report on the State of the Environment and Development

of the Durban Metropolitan Area, Volume 2, compiled by Doug Hindson. Submitted to Executive Director

(Physical Environment Service unity), North Central Council, Durban Metropolitan Area.



[45] Ibid.



[48] Ibid.